2026 H1-rapport
Kun PDF
27 dager siden
Ordredybde
Euronext Growth Oslo
Antall
Kjøp
400 000
Selg
Antall
16 284
Siste handler
| Tid | Pris | Antall | Kjøpere | Selger |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | - | - | - |
Høy
0,468VWAP
Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
VWAP
Høy
0,468Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
Meglerstatistikk
Fant ingen data
Selskapshendelser
| Kommende | |
|---|---|
| 2026 Q2-rapport | 31. des. 3 dager |
| Historisk | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2026 H1-rapport | 1. des. | |
| 2025 Q4-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 H2-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 Q2-rapport | 19. des. 2024 | |
| 2025 H1-rapport | 19. des. 2024 |
Data hentes fra Quartr, FactSet
Kunder besøkte også
Shareville
Bli med i samtalen på SharevilleEt fellesskap av investorer som deler innsikt og kunnskap i sine porteføljer.
Logg inn
for 19 t sidenfor 19 t sidenLånt fra fa forum: TheLondonOiler 21. desember Having followed this Facebook page for some time, I recently came across an interview which I had translated into English to better understand it. It offers another revealing snapshot of the current state of ETAP and the wider hydrocarbons sector in Tunisia. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=707336915764558 What is becoming clearer in Tunisia is not simply recurring allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Energy, but a deeper weakness in how the state manages its most valuable assets. Recent remarks by MPs go beyond generic accusations. They point to prolonged mismanagement of the oil sector, weak enforcement of concession terms, and opaque decision making that has persisted across successive governments. This does not read as episodic criticism, but as an institutional problem that has compounded over time and is now surfacing more openly under fiscal strain. When lawmakers openly ask where oil revenues have gone, why more than a thousand drilled wells appear to deliver limited benefit to the state, and why dozens of exploitation licences continue well beyond their original contractual timelines, it reinforces a reality investors already factor in. Governance risk in Tunisia is visible in outcomes. The state remains heavily reliant on taxation, borrowing and central bank support, while sectors that should generate sustainable revenue remain locked in disputes, delays and persistent allegations of mismanagement. One of the more striking elements of the interview is its focus on oversight failure. References to inactive audit bodies, limited engagement from the Court of Auditors, and senior roles within the energy ministry circulating through the same networks suggest a systemic issue rather than isolated contractual problems. Allegations that concession renewals and field transfers have taken place under unclear authority, sometimes involving intermediary entities and deferred payment arrangements, further raise questions around effective control of state assets. This broader backdrop is directly relevant when assessing Zenith Energy’s ICSID arbitration against Tunisia. The case is often viewed in isolation, but it fits naturally into this wider pattern. Contractual uncertainty, administrative obstruction, delayed approvals and inconsistent application of regulatory rules are precisely the conditions international investment treaties are designed to address. Where domestic processes stall or lose credibility, arbitration becomes a function of structure rather than strategy. What supports Zenith’s position is not narrative, but consistency with what is now being acknowledged internally. Tunisian political figures are themselves drawing attention to weaknesses in resource governance, accountability gaps within the energy ministry, and unresolved issues surrounding concession management and renewals. From an arbitration perspective, this complicates any portrayal of orderly administration and lends weight to claims of arbitrary or unfair treatment under treaty protections. The fiscal context adds further pressure. Tunisia is operating under significant budgetary strain, with MPs openly questioning the absence of non tax revenue streams in state accounts. Any adverse outcome in a large ICSID case would arrive at a difficult moment, landing on a state already struggling to broaden its revenue base and stabilise investor confidence. That reality highlights the cost of allowing disputes in strategic sectors to drift rather than being addressed transparently at an earlier stage. For investors focused on North Africa, the conclusion remains familiar. Resource potential alone is not enough. Predictable enforcement, institutional competence and respect for contractual frameworks remain decisive. Where those elements weaken, capital becomes cautious, increasingly legalistic, and more dependent on international mechanisms. Taken together, material like this interview increasingly places Zenith’s arbitration in context. Rather than appearing as an isolated dispute, it reads as a foreseeable consequence of structural weaknesses now being acknowledged domestically. From an investor standpoint, this strengthens the assessment that Zenith’s case rests on solid ground and that the probability of a favourable outcome is higher than often assumed. If the tribunal aligns treaty standards with the realities emerging from within Tunisia itself, recovering a meaningful share of the USD 573 million claim looks grounded in process rather than optimism. As the case advances, the distance between public discourse inside Tunisia and the evidentiary record before ICSID continues to narrow, a dynamic that is becoming harder to ignore. The ICSID case is going to start quite shortly in April and will be interesting to see what unfolds.
·for 2 døgn sidenEn liten oppdatering/julehilsen fra Zenith: https://x.com/zenithenergyltd/status/2004136526163464385 Ingen nyheter, men bare en kortfattet oppsummering av 2025 og et blikk mot 2026, som kan bli avgjørende i forhold til ICSID og en mulig annullering av ICC2. Det blir spennende å følge det neste halve året! Jeg beholder alle mine aksjer og regner med et positivt utfall av ICSID.
23. des.23. des.For sikkerhetsskyld er det greit med en liten lyttepost i dette jallaselskapet 😎🙃
23. des.23. des.Kan se ut som nedsalget etter emisjonen begynner å bli ferdig nå. Nå som emisjonsspøkelset er borte bør det være gode sjanser for en solid opptur. 👍
Kommentarene ovenfor kommer fra brukere på Nordnets sosiale nettverk Shareville og er verken redigert eller forhåndsvist av Nordnet. De innebærer ikke at Nordnet gir investeringsråd eller investeringsanbefalinger. Nordnet påtar seg ikke ansvar for kommentarene.
Nyheter
Nyheter og/eller generelle investeringsanbefalinger, eller utdrag av disse på denne siden og øvrige lenker, er produsert og levert av den spesifiserte leverandøren. Nordnet har ikke deltatt i utarbeidelsen, og har ikke gjennomgått eller gjort endringer i materialet. Les mer om investeringsanbefalinger.
2026 H1-rapport
Kun PDF
27 dager siden
Nyheter
Nyheter og/eller generelle investeringsanbefalinger, eller utdrag av disse på denne siden og øvrige lenker, er produsert og levert av den spesifiserte leverandøren. Nordnet har ikke deltatt i utarbeidelsen, og har ikke gjennomgått eller gjort endringer i materialet. Les mer om investeringsanbefalinger.
Shareville
Bli med i samtalen på SharevilleEt fellesskap av investorer som deler innsikt og kunnskap i sine porteføljer.
Logg inn
- for 19 t sidenfor 19 t sidenLånt fra fa forum: TheLondonOiler 21. desember Having followed this Facebook page for some time, I recently came across an interview which I had translated into English to better understand it. It offers another revealing snapshot of the current state of ETAP and the wider hydrocarbons sector in Tunisia. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=707336915764558 What is becoming clearer in Tunisia is not simply recurring allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Energy, but a deeper weakness in how the state manages its most valuable assets. Recent remarks by MPs go beyond generic accusations. They point to prolonged mismanagement of the oil sector, weak enforcement of concession terms, and opaque decision making that has persisted across successive governments. This does not read as episodic criticism, but as an institutional problem that has compounded over time and is now surfacing more openly under fiscal strain. When lawmakers openly ask where oil revenues have gone, why more than a thousand drilled wells appear to deliver limited benefit to the state, and why dozens of exploitation licences continue well beyond their original contractual timelines, it reinforces a reality investors already factor in. Governance risk in Tunisia is visible in outcomes. The state remains heavily reliant on taxation, borrowing and central bank support, while sectors that should generate sustainable revenue remain locked in disputes, delays and persistent allegations of mismanagement. One of the more striking elements of the interview is its focus on oversight failure. References to inactive audit bodies, limited engagement from the Court of Auditors, and senior roles within the energy ministry circulating through the same networks suggest a systemic issue rather than isolated contractual problems. Allegations that concession renewals and field transfers have taken place under unclear authority, sometimes involving intermediary entities and deferred payment arrangements, further raise questions around effective control of state assets. This broader backdrop is directly relevant when assessing Zenith Energy’s ICSID arbitration against Tunisia. The case is often viewed in isolation, but it fits naturally into this wider pattern. Contractual uncertainty, administrative obstruction, delayed approvals and inconsistent application of regulatory rules are precisely the conditions international investment treaties are designed to address. Where domestic processes stall or lose credibility, arbitration becomes a function of structure rather than strategy. What supports Zenith’s position is not narrative, but consistency with what is now being acknowledged internally. Tunisian political figures are themselves drawing attention to weaknesses in resource governance, accountability gaps within the energy ministry, and unresolved issues surrounding concession management and renewals. From an arbitration perspective, this complicates any portrayal of orderly administration and lends weight to claims of arbitrary or unfair treatment under treaty protections. The fiscal context adds further pressure. Tunisia is operating under significant budgetary strain, with MPs openly questioning the absence of non tax revenue streams in state accounts. Any adverse outcome in a large ICSID case would arrive at a difficult moment, landing on a state already struggling to broaden its revenue base and stabilise investor confidence. That reality highlights the cost of allowing disputes in strategic sectors to drift rather than being addressed transparently at an earlier stage. For investors focused on North Africa, the conclusion remains familiar. Resource potential alone is not enough. Predictable enforcement, institutional competence and respect for contractual frameworks remain decisive. Where those elements weaken, capital becomes cautious, increasingly legalistic, and more dependent on international mechanisms. Taken together, material like this interview increasingly places Zenith’s arbitration in context. Rather than appearing as an isolated dispute, it reads as a foreseeable consequence of structural weaknesses now being acknowledged domestically. From an investor standpoint, this strengthens the assessment that Zenith’s case rests on solid ground and that the probability of a favourable outcome is higher than often assumed. If the tribunal aligns treaty standards with the realities emerging from within Tunisia itself, recovering a meaningful share of the USD 573 million claim looks grounded in process rather than optimism. As the case advances, the distance between public discourse inside Tunisia and the evidentiary record before ICSID continues to narrow, a dynamic that is becoming harder to ignore. The ICSID case is going to start quite shortly in April and will be interesting to see what unfolds.
- ·for 2 døgn sidenEn liten oppdatering/julehilsen fra Zenith: https://x.com/zenithenergyltd/status/2004136526163464385 Ingen nyheter, men bare en kortfattet oppsummering av 2025 og et blikk mot 2026, som kan bli avgjørende i forhold til ICSID og en mulig annullering av ICC2. Det blir spennende å følge det neste halve året! Jeg beholder alle mine aksjer og regner med et positivt utfall av ICSID.
- 23. des.23. des.For sikkerhetsskyld er det greit med en liten lyttepost i dette jallaselskapet 😎🙃
- 23. des.23. des.Kan se ut som nedsalget etter emisjonen begynner å bli ferdig nå. Nå som emisjonsspøkelset er borte bør det være gode sjanser for en solid opptur. 👍
Kommentarene ovenfor kommer fra brukere på Nordnets sosiale nettverk Shareville og er verken redigert eller forhåndsvist av Nordnet. De innebærer ikke at Nordnet gir investeringsråd eller investeringsanbefalinger. Nordnet påtar seg ikke ansvar for kommentarene.
Ordredybde
Euronext Growth Oslo
Antall
Kjøp
400 000
Selg
Antall
16 284
Siste handler
| Tid | Pris | Antall | Kjøpere | Selger |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | - | - | - |
Høy
0,468VWAP
Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
VWAP
Høy
0,468Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
Meglerstatistikk
Fant ingen data
Kunder besøkte også
Selskapshendelser
| Kommende | |
|---|---|
| 2026 Q2-rapport | 31. des. 3 dager |
| Historisk | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2026 H1-rapport | 1. des. | |
| 2025 Q4-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 H2-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 Q2-rapport | 19. des. 2024 | |
| 2025 H1-rapport | 19. des. 2024 |
Data hentes fra Quartr, FactSet
2026 H1-rapport
Kun PDF
27 dager siden
Nyheter
Nyheter og/eller generelle investeringsanbefalinger, eller utdrag av disse på denne siden og øvrige lenker, er produsert og levert av den spesifiserte leverandøren. Nordnet har ikke deltatt i utarbeidelsen, og har ikke gjennomgått eller gjort endringer i materialet. Les mer om investeringsanbefalinger.
Selskapshendelser
| Kommende | |
|---|---|
| 2026 Q2-rapport | 31. des. 3 dager |
| Historisk | ||
|---|---|---|
| 2026 H1-rapport | 1. des. | |
| 2025 Q4-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 H2-rapport | 22. juli | |
| 2025 Q2-rapport | 19. des. 2024 | |
| 2025 H1-rapport | 19. des. 2024 |
Data hentes fra Quartr, FactSet
Shareville
Bli med i samtalen på SharevilleEt fellesskap av investorer som deler innsikt og kunnskap i sine porteføljer.
Logg inn
- for 19 t sidenfor 19 t sidenLånt fra fa forum: TheLondonOiler 21. desember Having followed this Facebook page for some time, I recently came across an interview which I had translated into English to better understand it. It offers another revealing snapshot of the current state of ETAP and the wider hydrocarbons sector in Tunisia. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=707336915764558 What is becoming clearer in Tunisia is not simply recurring allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Energy, but a deeper weakness in how the state manages its most valuable assets. Recent remarks by MPs go beyond generic accusations. They point to prolonged mismanagement of the oil sector, weak enforcement of concession terms, and opaque decision making that has persisted across successive governments. This does not read as episodic criticism, but as an institutional problem that has compounded over time and is now surfacing more openly under fiscal strain. When lawmakers openly ask where oil revenues have gone, why more than a thousand drilled wells appear to deliver limited benefit to the state, and why dozens of exploitation licences continue well beyond their original contractual timelines, it reinforces a reality investors already factor in. Governance risk in Tunisia is visible in outcomes. The state remains heavily reliant on taxation, borrowing and central bank support, while sectors that should generate sustainable revenue remain locked in disputes, delays and persistent allegations of mismanagement. One of the more striking elements of the interview is its focus on oversight failure. References to inactive audit bodies, limited engagement from the Court of Auditors, and senior roles within the energy ministry circulating through the same networks suggest a systemic issue rather than isolated contractual problems. Allegations that concession renewals and field transfers have taken place under unclear authority, sometimes involving intermediary entities and deferred payment arrangements, further raise questions around effective control of state assets. This broader backdrop is directly relevant when assessing Zenith Energy’s ICSID arbitration against Tunisia. The case is often viewed in isolation, but it fits naturally into this wider pattern. Contractual uncertainty, administrative obstruction, delayed approvals and inconsistent application of regulatory rules are precisely the conditions international investment treaties are designed to address. Where domestic processes stall or lose credibility, arbitration becomes a function of structure rather than strategy. What supports Zenith’s position is not narrative, but consistency with what is now being acknowledged internally. Tunisian political figures are themselves drawing attention to weaknesses in resource governance, accountability gaps within the energy ministry, and unresolved issues surrounding concession management and renewals. From an arbitration perspective, this complicates any portrayal of orderly administration and lends weight to claims of arbitrary or unfair treatment under treaty protections. The fiscal context adds further pressure. Tunisia is operating under significant budgetary strain, with MPs openly questioning the absence of non tax revenue streams in state accounts. Any adverse outcome in a large ICSID case would arrive at a difficult moment, landing on a state already struggling to broaden its revenue base and stabilise investor confidence. That reality highlights the cost of allowing disputes in strategic sectors to drift rather than being addressed transparently at an earlier stage. For investors focused on North Africa, the conclusion remains familiar. Resource potential alone is not enough. Predictable enforcement, institutional competence and respect for contractual frameworks remain decisive. Where those elements weaken, capital becomes cautious, increasingly legalistic, and more dependent on international mechanisms. Taken together, material like this interview increasingly places Zenith’s arbitration in context. Rather than appearing as an isolated dispute, it reads as a foreseeable consequence of structural weaknesses now being acknowledged domestically. From an investor standpoint, this strengthens the assessment that Zenith’s case rests on solid ground and that the probability of a favourable outcome is higher than often assumed. If the tribunal aligns treaty standards with the realities emerging from within Tunisia itself, recovering a meaningful share of the USD 573 million claim looks grounded in process rather than optimism. As the case advances, the distance between public discourse inside Tunisia and the evidentiary record before ICSID continues to narrow, a dynamic that is becoming harder to ignore. The ICSID case is going to start quite shortly in April and will be interesting to see what unfolds.
- ·for 2 døgn sidenEn liten oppdatering/julehilsen fra Zenith: https://x.com/zenithenergyltd/status/2004136526163464385 Ingen nyheter, men bare en kortfattet oppsummering av 2025 og et blikk mot 2026, som kan bli avgjørende i forhold til ICSID og en mulig annullering av ICC2. Det blir spennende å følge det neste halve året! Jeg beholder alle mine aksjer og regner med et positivt utfall av ICSID.
- 23. des.23. des.For sikkerhetsskyld er det greit med en liten lyttepost i dette jallaselskapet 😎🙃
- 23. des.23. des.Kan se ut som nedsalget etter emisjonen begynner å bli ferdig nå. Nå som emisjonsspøkelset er borte bør det være gode sjanser for en solid opptur. 👍
Kommentarene ovenfor kommer fra brukere på Nordnets sosiale nettverk Shareville og er verken redigert eller forhåndsvist av Nordnet. De innebærer ikke at Nordnet gir investeringsråd eller investeringsanbefalinger. Nordnet påtar seg ikke ansvar for kommentarene.
Ordredybde
Euronext Growth Oslo
Antall
Kjøp
400 000
Selg
Antall
16 284
Siste handler
| Tid | Pris | Antall | Kjøpere | Selger |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | - | - | - |
Høy
0,468VWAP
Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
VWAP
Høy
0,468Lav
0,445OmsetningAntall
0,7 1 501 069
Meglerstatistikk
Fant ingen data